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Why They Do It: Inside the Mind of the 
White-Collar Criminal, by Eugene Soltes1
LARISSA LUCAS2
SOCIOLOGIST EDWIN SUTHERLAND FIRST COINED the term “white-collar crime” 
on December 27, 1939 during his presidential address at the fifty-second annual 
meeting of the American Sociological Society.3 Sutherland began his speech by 
arguing that much of what his colleagues understood about crime—namely, 
that it was restricted to the streets and largely committed by individuals in the 
lower social classes—was “misleading and incorrect.”4 According to Sutherland, 
the most serious criminal offences were not being committed by the poor 
or the “delinquent,” but rather by society’s most “respected business and 
professional men.”5
Seventy-five years later, following Sutherland’s speech, white-collar crime 
has continued to evolve and has become increasingly intricate and complex. 
Sutherland’s basic argument, however, has perhaps never been more poignant. 
Rarely does a week go by without newspaper headlines reporting that another 
well-known executive has been indicted for engaging in white-collar crime. From 
Enron to the 2008 financial crisis, white-collar crime is often a regular fixture in 
the news and its effects are devastating and far reaching. But what drives wealthy 
and powerful individuals, who seemingly have it all, to commit these crimes?
1. (New York: PublicAffairs, 2016).
2. Larissa Lucas is a JD Graduate (2017) from Osgoode Hall Law School in Toronto, Canada.
3. Edwin H Sutherland, “White-Collar Criminality” (1940) 5:1 Am Soc Rev 1.
4. Ibid at 2.
5. Ibid at 1.
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Eugene Soltes, Jakurski Family Associate Professor of Business Administration 
at Harvard Business School, addresses this question in his debut book, Why They 
Do It: Inside the Mind of the White-Collar Criminal. Soltes’s groundbreaking 
analysis is truly the first of its kind since Sutherland initially studied the question 
in his seminal work, White Collar Crime.6 Sutherland analyzed the misdeeds of 
seventy of America’s largest corporations and their executives in order to explain the 
origins and dynamics of white-collar crime. Soltes takes Sutherland’s original idea 
a step further, drawing from extensive personal interaction and correspondence 
with nearly fifty former executives over a period of seven years, in addition to 
using the latest research in psychology, criminology, and economics to investigate 
how once-celebrated executives become white-collar criminals.
The two books differ greatly in that Sutherland’s publisher, fearing legal 
repercussions in the timid climate of the 1940s, required him to remove 
identifying markers, including names, of the corporations and individuals 
involved in the illegal activity. Soltes’s work does not face the same restrictions. 
However, they are similar in both their quality of analysis and novel contribution 
to the existing body of literature.
Why They Do It is particularly topical given the increasing globalization of 
business and developments in technology that threaten our society with even 
more devastating corporate misconduct. The extraordinary costs to victims 
of corporate misconduct are clear and have been addressed extensively in the 
literature. Soltes’s contribution is unique in that it allows the reader to peer 
deeply into the minds of the many prominent perpetrators of white-collar crime 
through their firsthand accounts. Accordingly, the lessons Soltes draws on in Why 
They Do It are needed more now than ever.
In Why They Do It, Soltes argues that the explanations for white-collar crime 
that have been put forth by academics thus far fail to paint a comprehensive 
picture as to why many seemingly successful people cross the proverbial line. 
According to Soltes, white-collar criminals are not merely driven by their excessive 
greed or hubris, nor do they undertake a calculated cost-benefit analysis before 
deliberately undertaking to break the law. Instead, Soltes demonstrates that the 
executives he studied who committed crimes did so on the basis of their intuitions 
and gut feelings. Executives frequently find themselves in a position where they 
must make important decisions under pressure and with imperfect information, 
and are thus forced to—as Soltes puts it—“manag[e] the gray.”7 Soltes notes 
that these “gut feelings” are often poorly suited for the modern business world, 
6. Edwin H Sutherland, White Collar Crime (New York: Dryden Press, 1949).
7. Soltes, supra note 1 at 7.
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where business leaders are increasingly distanced from the consequences of their 
decisions and the victims they impact.
I. THE STRUGGLE TO CRIMINALIZE
Soltes does an excellent job of setting the stage by explaining the historical, legal, 
and political context through which white-collar crime came to be publically 
condemned and regulated. This detailed background is a strong platform for 
the analysis that follows, and provides an exemplary breakdown of the factors 
leading to the birth of white-collar crime in the United States. Soltes begins 
by telling the story of how the conduct now conceptualized as white-collar 
crime came to be criminalized. Soltes notes that if his book “had been written a 
hundred years earlier, much of the business misconduct described … would not 
have been illegal.”8 Further, to the extent that the law prohibited this conduct, 
violations produced little public condemnation and few prosecutions. Up until 
a half-century ago, the public generally stood behind executives who were 
prosecuted for white-collar offenses. Throughout the latter half of the twentieth 
century, however, public sentiment changed and regulators began to design and 
enforce laws to restrict white-collar crime.
   Edwin Sutherland figures prominently in the birth of white-collar crime, 
as does the political climate that eventually led to the regulation of executive 
misconduct. Following the stock market crash of October 1929, the United States 
Congress introduced legislation to regulate corporate financial reporting and 
securities trading. Franklin D Roosevelt focused on this in his 1932 presidential 
campaign, highlighting the dangers posed by irresponsible business practices 
and proposing regulation to control the “privileged princes.”9 Despite resistance 
from corporate leaders, legislators eventually recognized the need to address 
weak state blue-sky laws.10 This led to the first major pieces of federal securities 
regulation in the United States: the Securities Act of 193311 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934.12 It was not until the 1960s, however, that executives began 
being criminally prosecuted for behaviour such as collusion and price-fixing, and 
“sending them to prison was still a foreign and uncomfortable idea.”13
8. Ibid at 8.
9. Ibid at 20-21.
10. Blue-sky state laws are designed to protect consumers and investors against fraudulent sales 
practices and activities. See ibid at 21.
11. Securities Act of 1933, 15 USC § 77a et seq (1933).
12. Securities Act of 1934, 15 USC § 78a et seq (1934). See also Soltes, supra note 1 at 21.
13. Soltes, supra note 1 at 31.
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History and context are important factors in understanding the 
criminalization of white-collar crime. By the end of the 1970s, the head of 
the American Bar Association’s Section on Litigation stated that white-collar 
criminal defense was the fastest-growing legal specialty.14 The Department of 
Justice officially made white-collar crime a top priority in 1978, and legislators 
passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 197715 (“FCPA”), which “significantly 
restrict[ed] corporate behavior that the public felt was not just unethical but 
criminal.”16 The FCPA made bribery of foreign officials a criminal offense for the 
first time—prior to its enactment, foreign bribery was not only explicitly legal, 
but also tax deductible.17
II. NATURE OR NURTURE? REASONING OR INTUITION?
Soltes explores the various explanations for why people commit white-collar 
crimes in Part II of the book, and argues that the cost-benefit explanation of 
white-collar crime fails to fit the evidence. He looks at the various psychological 
and sociological explanations for executive deviance with impressive expertise. 
It is here where Soltes begins to reject the notion that executives make calculated 
decisions to commit criminal acts. He instead suggests that these acts are a result 
of executives relying on their imperfect intuition in imperfect situations where 
they are frequently required to make important decisions.
Part II also highlights the impact of the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
of 200218 (“SOX”) in the United States. The SOX was designed by regulators to 
address the very issue that Soltes has identified—namely, that executives do not 
think carefully enough before making major decisions. More specifically, SOX 
deals with the reliability and accuracy of firms’ financial statements. SOX requires 
senior executives to personally attest to the accuracy of their firm’s statements by 
signing the financial report, thereby providing “a final opportunity to reflect—
and reconsider—the consequences of filing a fraudulent financial statement.”19 
But Soltes argues that the solution that regulators designed in the form of SOX 
is ineffective: “By the time a manager appreciates that he should have made a 
decision differently, it’s often too late.”20
14. See ibid at 37.
15. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub L No 95-213, 91 Stat 1494 [FCPA].
16. Soltes, supra note 1 at 37.
17. See ibid.
18. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub L No 107-204, 116 Stat 745 [SOX].
19. Soltes, supra note 1 at 156.
20. Ibid.
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III. THE BUSINESS OF MALFEASANCE
In the final part of the book, Soltes focuses on conversations and correspondence 
with former executives and how they reflect on their actions. He divides this 
part into six chapters, with five of the six chapters dealing with a different type 
of white-collar crime: (1) misleading financial disclosure, (2) financial reporting 
fraud, (3) insider trading, (4) deceptive financial structures, and (5) Ponzi 
schemes. This structure lends itself particularly well to displaying the breadth 
of Soltes’s research and analysis, as it allows him to effectively discuss what each 
offense entails, the legal regulation of each type of misconduct and the history 
behind it, and give examples of how the offenses played out in practice through 
accounts of his conversations with former executives.
Each of these chapters provides a range of tangible examples supporting 
Soltes’s overarching thesis. For example, in chapter 12 (which discusses deceptive 
financial structures), Soltes details the rise and fall of Enron. He notes that:
Figuring out how aggressively to pursue loopholes is a difficult question without 
an easy answer. Sometimes exploiting loopholes is applauded as inventive, while 
at other times it’s destructive. However, we can see what happens if everytime a 
business encounters a law preventing it from moving forward, its executives see it as 
another hurdle to be jumped over, a problem to be solved.21
Through conversations with Enron’s Chief Financial Officer, Andrew Fastow, 
Soltes paints a picture of how various “loopholes” in the law and in Enron’s 
organizational structure and corporate culture allowed one of the most significant 
financial frauds in history to be perpetrated. Fastow said:
I was doing exactly what I was incentivized to do. We wouldn’t have gone through 
all this trouble if we just wanted to cheat. We were finding ways to get around the 
rules but going through a complex process to find the loopholes to allow us to do it.22
The final chapter changes tack and examines an individual: perhaps the 
most famous white-collar criminal, Bernie Madoff. Bernie Madoff, unlike 
Fastow, preferred to view the fraudulent scheme for which he was convicted—
the largest Ponzi scheme in history—as something closer to oversight than to 
recklessness. According to Madoff, “[e]veryone thinks I had this master plan and 
they give me credit for being this master thief. That was not the situation.”23 
21. Ibid at 231. Soltes gives modern-day examples of “applauding loopholes” by citing such 
companies as Uber and Airbnb. See ibid at 227-29.
22. Ibid at 243.
23. Ibid at 308.
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While Soltes’s analysis of Madoff would have undoubtedly fit well with the 
chapter on Ponzi schemes, Soltes takes the opportunity to give Madoff his own 
chapter. This underscores not only the magnitude of Madoff’s misconduct, 
but also the differences between Madoff and the other individuals discussed 
throughout the book.
IV. CONCLUSION
While Why They Do It is helpful in illuminating the background context of 
white-collar crime and providing a platform off which Soltes is able to build 
his argument, it is the final part of the book that is the true masterpiece. 
No other work has come close to doing what Soltes does here. His interviews 
and correspondence with more than fifty white-collar criminals over a seven-year 
period provide unprecedented insight into a previously unexplored area of the 
law: Why do white-collar criminals do what they do? Soltes tackles head-on our 
troubling lack of understanding of this phenomenon.
The book also stands out in its multi-disciplinary aspect. Few works 
combine law, business, history, and psychology in such a masterful way as to 
paint a complete picture of white-collar crime. Soltes demonstrates an ability to 
effectively summarize the existing literature on the topic while also advancing his 
own unique and highly persuasive argument.
Soltes provides a few recommendations for preventing future incidences 
of white-collar crime, including revamping ethics curricula in business schools 
and creating “uncomfortable dissonance” for executives through corporate 
governance structures that require seeking disagreement.24 Ultimately, Soltes’s 
book will change how readers think about why executives commit white-collar 
crime. He concludes:
Appreciating our [own] lack of invincibility—our inherent weakness and frailty—
offers us the best chance of designing the appropriate mechanisms to help manage 
these limitations. If we learn to be more suspicious of our gut feelings when 
placed in new or difficult situations, we can acknowledge the need to create more 
opportunities for reflection and to bring in the viewpoints of others to question 
us. If we humbly recognize that we might not always even notice the choices that 
will lead us astray, we are more likely to develop ways to identify and control those 
decisions. But it’s only when we realize that our ability to err is much greater than we 
often think it is that we’ll begin taking the necessary steps to change and improve.25
24. Ibid at 315.
25. Ibid at 329-30.
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Although the book focuses almost exclusively on the United States, Soltes’s 
underlying sentiment transcends geographic boundaries and is universally 
valuable. Canada is not without its own recent instances of large-scale corporate 
misconduct—for example, Nortel and Livent—and as such, this book will be 
highly relevant to the Canadian reader.
